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The logical positivism had an important impact on the Danish intellectual climate before World War Two.  During the thirties close relations were established between members of the Vienna Circle and philosophers and scientists in Copenhagen. This influence not only affected Danish philosophy and science; it also impinged on the cultural avant-garde and via them on the public debate concerning social and political reforms. Hand in hand with the positivistic ideas you find functionalism emerging as a new heretical language in art, architecture, and design. Not surprisingly, you may say, since the logical positivists’ wishes of stripping philosophy of metaphysics is spiritually similar to the functionalists’ desire to get rid of symbols and ornaments.
One event more than anything confirmed the connection between the Vienna Circle, Denmark, and the rest of the Nordic countries.  For a short while Copenhagen became the centre for the Circle’s activities when in 1936 the 2. Inter​nationale Kongress für Einheit des Wissens​chaft was held there between June 21st and 26th. A photograph, taken during the conference, shows many of the participants sitting in the hall of Carlsberg’s honorary mansion where Niels Bohr at that time lived. Among the audience you find Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997) and Karl Popper (1902-1994), but also some of the more prominent Danish scientists and scholars whose world views were congenial with the logical positivists.
In the foreground Jørgen Jørgensen (1894-1964) stands half turned towards the photographer, half turned towards the participants whom he is about to welcome. Jørgensen was the general secretary of the conference and had been, together with Neurath, the primary motor behind the organization of the meeting in Copenhagen. Behind Jørgensen, to the right on the first row of seats, is Niels Bohr (1885-1962) sitting next to Philipp Frank (1884-1966).  Right behind Bohr is George de Hevesy (1885-1966), and again behind him, on the third row, you see Harald Bohr (1887-1951) professor of mathematics. On some of the other rows you find Alf Ross (1899-1962), a Danish philosopher of law, and Edgar Rubin (1886-1951), a Danish philosopher and psychologist.
Many chairs in the first two rows are empty. This may due to the fact that several of the invited guests had difficulties getting to the opening of the conference because of the political situation in Germany and Austria. Philosophers like Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), and Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) had all expressed their wishes to be in Copenhagen, but various reasons prohibited them from coming. Thus, Schlick had been denied a travel permit from Austria which turned out to be fatal. A mentally deranged student killed him at June 22th at the steps of the University of Vienna. The conference in Copenhagen received the message about Schlick’s death with horror. At that time Reichenbach was staying in Turkey as a refugee and could not afford the long journey to Denmark. And several of the most prominent members of the Circle had fled to America where Herbert Feigl (1902-1988) arrived in 1931 and Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) in 1935 from Prague. 

Bohr’s instrumental view on quantum mechanics
The congress in 1936 was not the first time that Neurath visited Denmark. Two years earlier he came to Copenhagen twice. Jørgensen had invited him to give a series of lectures in The Society for Philosophy and Psychology. The first time was April the 6th 1934 when he gave a speech on the topic “Psychologie und Sociologie auf physikalicher Grundlage”. The second time was between October the 18th and the 24th 1934 when he gave six seminars concerning issues in epistemology.​[1]​ Niels Bohr took part in two of these sessions.
Less than a month later, on November 14th 1934, Neurath wrote Carnap a letter in which he described his first experience with Bohr:

“Bohr. Idiosyncratic. An intense man. Came to two lectures and joined the discussion enthusiastically ... Basic line: he does not want to be considered a metaphysician. And he is able to express himself relatively non-metaphysically, when he is careful. Yet obviously there lies a certain tendency in the selection of problems, insofar as the question of life, etc. is discussed, as well as in the stress on uncertainty. In addition, his printed remarks are full of crass metaphysics. But he possesses certain basic attitudes which agree with mine, e.g., that in science one cannot clear up everything at once, but that the individual scientific-logical actions have to pay a price, as it were. An idea of compensation, which with him naturally tends to be connected with the uncertainty relation. Obviously tries to come into agreement with us. But since his circle confirms him in his habit to express himself somewhat unclearly, one would have to be able to work on him for a long time, which he would be prepared to do.” ​[2]​


Apparently, Neurath saw an obvious similarity between the ideas of the logical positivism and Bohr’s thoughts on complementarity, although he was dissatisfied with the way Bohr articulated them. Neurath also hinted at his own analogy according to which knowledge is like a boat in open sea. It is impossible to change all the beams at once, but one can change one plank at a time. Here Bohr seemed to have agreed.
    The very same day Neurath left Copenhagen, Bohr sent him one of his books, possibly the German version of Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (Niels Bohr's Philosophical Writings Volume I) along with a letter in which he states his pleasure concerning the fact that their ideas were not so far apart from each other as one might otherwise think from their different ways of expression. Bohr and Neurath corresponded over the next couple of years, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that Neurath’s criticism of Bohr's metaphysical language bore fruit when Bohr had to face Einstein’s last challenge the following year.
What was it then that Neurath thought was so metaphysical about Bohr’s expressions?  We can only guess. But if we look at what Bohr said before 1935 and what he said afterwards, certain hints seem to reveal a possible answer.​[3]​ In 1935 Einstein published, together with two other physicists, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, a paper containing a strong criticism of Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, including a thought experiment which apparently showed that quantum mechanics did not add up.  It turned out that this criticism had an important influence on Bohr’s future formulation of his view of complementarity. 
The situation in physics of the day was that Heisenberg in 1925 had discovered a new physical theory which was able to describe atomic phenomena where Bohr’s own successful theory of the atom from 1913 eventually had failed. Heisenberg’s theory seemed to jeopardize any classical description of a physical system such as a joint ascription of momentum and space-time coordinates to an atomic object. Two years later Bohr had suggested that the understanding of the atomic object still demanded the use of classical concepts by which he meant concepts such as energy, momentum, and space-time coordinates. But the application of these concepts had to be restricted to particular circumstances in which the corresponding properties had a definite measured value. The consequence was that quantum mechanics did not allow a precise ascription of dynamical and kinematical properties simultaneously, as classical mechanics did. The different attributions, which in classical mechanics happened at once, were according to Bohr complementary to one another.
Up to 1935 Bohr believed that physicists, through their measurement of an atomic object, disturbed the object in such a manner that they could not exactly determine its position and momentum at the same time. This way of talking made it sound as if the atomic object could be considered as a Kantian thing-in-itself. The atomic object had some values or properties, when nobody interacted with it, but it took on different values or properties during its observation when it was disturbed by the experimental equipment. It was just this impression Einstein seemed to have gotten by his discussions with Bohr and by reading his papers. Einstein therefore believed that quantum mechanics was incomplete (after he first had failed to show that it was inconsistent) because it could not account for these atoms-in-themselves.  Neurath, however, contrary to Einstein, would find any talk of the disturbance of such things-in-themselves very problematic if not complete nonsensical.
Thus, in order to defend quantum mechanics as complete Bohr was forced by the challenge of  Einstein, Podolski, and Rosen’s paper to get rid of any formulation that indicated the existence of a physical reality behind the world of experience having quite different properties than we were able to observe. The only thing a physicist could rely on was that the atom as an observable phenomenon was describable in relation to a certain measuring apparatus. The reference to the experimental circumstances therefore became the conditions under which it made sense to apply a certain observable property, parameter, or eigenstate.
Bohr's first philosophical essay after the EPR exchange, “Causality and Complementarity” was his contribution to the Second International Congress for the Unity of Science, in Copenhagen. It was published the next year in English, German, and Danish. Here he first clearly distinguished his view from the “disturbance” interpretation suggested by his earlier statements of the late 1920's, which interpreted the uncertainty relations as merely an epistemological limitation on what can be known due to the “uncontrollable interaction” on the object of investigation. It is not clear whether Bohr was ever tempted to hold such a view earlier, but at least after EPR, he flatly states that “the whole situation in atomic physics deprives of all meaning such inherent attributes as the idealizations of classical physics would ascribe to such objects.”​[4]​ Bohr’s adjustment of his philosophical statement to this more semantic formulation which rejects the “metaphysical” notion of real but unknowable properties of objects is surely in line with the positivistic outlook and leads Bohr to take a more “linguistic turn” in the expression of complementarity. Reflecting this shift in his outlook, Bohr henceforth dropped his earlier reference to Heisenberg’s relations as “uncertainty relations” in favour of the expression “indeterminacy relations.” (Although Bohr returns to using “uncertainty” in his next paper delivered in Warsaw in 1938, that paper was rewritten from an earlier lecture delivered in Edinburgh; after this time, he consistently uses “indetermina​cy” and never “uncertainty” in the post-war papers.)
    Bohr’s idea of complementarity thus understood was not so different from Neurath’s and Carnap’s view of relating all statements about theoretical entities to statements about observable things expressed in terms of protocol sentences. Against Einstein’s metaphysical attitude towards a physical reality consisting of things-in-themselves, Bohr could just reply that it does not make sense to operate with a conception of reality other than one which can be described in sentences concerning our empirical knowledge. If experimental knowledge does prohibit an ascription of a precise position and a precise momentum at the same time, it does not make sense to talk about a free, undisturbed electron to have such values anyhow.
During the period in which Bohr was in touch with Neurath, he also corresponded with Philipp Frank, another leading member of the Vienna Circle and a professor of physics in Prague. In a long letter of January 9, 1936, to Bohr, Frank expresses his opinion about the recent discussion between Bohr and Einstein, attributing to Bohr a positivistic view of physical reality but to Einstein a purely metaphysical view. After his statement, he asks Bohr whether he has understood the matter correctly; Bohr answers in a letter of January 14, 1936:
   
“I am very glad to hear from your kind letter that you have given such care to the papers of Einstein and myself concerning the question of reality. I also think that you have caught the sense of my efforts very well.”​[5]​ 

In combination with what was just said about Neurath's criticism, it seems fair to say that Bohr shared with the positivists the view that physical reality could not be meaning​fully referred to as something existing behind the observable phenomena.
There was another point of Bohr’s philosophy which in the eyes of the positivists (and Bohr’s) seemed to match their basic tenets. The positivist believed, after they came to ground their claims of experience on a physicalist notion, that all scientific statements should be relatable to a language of physical things which was capable of satisfying a publicly agreed constraint and thereby come to refer to observable entities. (Carnap’s so-called reduction sentences no longer required eliminative reduction of non-observational terms to count as meaningful.) They drew a distinction between the language of observation XE "observation"  XE "language: observational"  and the language of theory XE "language: theoretical" . The language of observation contained terms for only those phenomena that could be observed whereas the language of theory contained words for entities postulated by theory. Observational terms and sentences acquire their meaning from a correlation between words and visible things – so-called ostensive definitions – while theoretical terms receive their meaning from being partially translatable into observational terms. At the same time observational statements (and those theoretical statements that are reducible to observational statements) are, in contrast to irreducible theoretical statements, truth-bearers. The result was that the positivists treated theories as a kind of logical instruments which could not be given a realist interpretation as far as it could not be translated into a language of observation.
Bohr for his part believed that atomic objects were real. A couple of times around 1929 he had emphasized that the experimental evidence for their existence were overwhelming. Nevertheless, he thought that the theory of quantum mechanics was an instrument of prediction and organization of the observable phenomena. So you may say that Bohr was an entity realist but an antirealist with respect to theories. Thus Bohr referred to the state vector or the wave function as a symbolic representation. Usually symbolic language stands in contrast to literal language. Bohr associated the latter form of representation with what can be visualized in space and time. Quantum systems are not vizualizable because they cannot be tracked down in space and time as classical systems. The reason is, according to Bohr, that the mathematical formulation of quantum states consists of imaginary numbers. Thus, the state vector is symbolic. But what if “symbolic” means that the state vector’s representational function should not be taken literally but be considered as a tool of calculation of probabilities of observables? Let me present one quotation of Bohr’s in which he directly says what I just have indicated:
“The entire formalism is to be considered as a tool for deriving predictions of definite or statistical character, as regards information obtainable under experimental conditions described in classical terms and specified by means of parameters entering into the algebraic or differential equations of which the matrices or the wave-functions, respectively, are solutions. These symbols themselves, as is indicated already by the use of imaginary numbers, are not susceptible to pictorial interpretation; and even derived real functions like densities and currents are only to be regarded as expressing the probabilities for the occurrence of individual events observable under well‑defined experimental conditions.” (Bohr 1948[1998]: 144)

Also consider the following: (a) in many places Bohr talks about the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics as the mathematical symbolism, and he talks about symbolic operators; (b) concerning the aim of science Bohr says: “In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of phenomena, but only to track down as far as possible relations between the manifold aspects of our experience” (Bohr 1929[1985]: 18); (c) “within the frame of the quantum mechanical formalism, according to which no well defined use of the concept of “state” can be made as referring to the object separate from the body with which it has been in contact, until the external conditions involved in the definition of this concept are unambiguously fixed by a further suitable control of the auxiliary body” (Bohr 1938b[1998]: 102, my emphasis)  –  in other words, it makes no sense to say that a quantum system has a definite kinematical or dynamical state prior to any measurement. Hence we can only ascribe a certain state to a system given those circumstances where we epistemically have access to their realization. Based on these and other considerations, I think it makes good sense to argue that Bohr was a realist with respect to atomic systems but antirealist with respect to their states. You may therefore say that Bohr shared a similar view of scientific theories as the logical positivists but that some of the arguments in favour of instrumentalism were different from theirs. 
There is perhaps a third point where there were some affinities between Bohr and the logical empiricists.  The unity of science movement accorded well with Bohr’s attempt to apply the principle of complementarity outside quantum mechanics and physics. Bohr believed that complementary descriptions were also epistemologically necessary in biology, psychology and cultural sciences, and he wrote several papers in which he argued for this idea. But again Bohr’s view on the unity of science was different from the positivists’ (cf. Neurath’s remarks to Carnap about Bohr’s treatment of the question of life).  It was not grounded in a reductivist approach. Instead, Bohr had the idea that holistic descriptions of an organism, a mind, or a culture was not reducible to any common physical-chemical description or any other low level descriptions. Rather holistic kinds of descriptions should be considered as complementary to reductive kinds of descriptions. 
The anti-metaphysical and positivistic features of Bohr’s philosophy were, as we shall see, also noticed by Jørgensen. Both Bohr and Jørgensen had been in touch with and influenced by Harald Høffding (1843-1931), whose philosophy more than anything was formed by Comte’s classical positivism and Kant’s and Spinoza’s philosophy. In every aspect of his philosophy, Høffding discarded metaphysical speculations, but he also believed the empirical sciences gave rise to metaphysical questions which philosophy could not answer. So with the rise of the neo-positivistic movement both Bohr and Jørgensen found an intellectual kinship with the spirit of the Vienna Circle.

The positivist’s reception of Bohr’s philosophy

On the conference in Copenhagen a couple of talks beside that of Bohr’s were dedicated to the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Philipp Frank gave one entitled “Philosophische Deutungen und Missdeutungen der Quantentheorie”, and Morris Schlick’s last paper “Quantentheorie und die Erkennbarkeit der Natur” was read to the audience. Both papers hailed Bohr for the positivistic setting he had given the understanding of the atom. But Jørgen Jørgensen, not surprisingly, seemed to have been the philosopher among the positivists who had the most nuanced grasp of Bohr’s view in not directly influenced by the logical positivism
The relation between Jørgensen and the Vienna Circle seems to go back to the beginning of the 1930s.​[6]​  The year before he was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen in 1926, he had written a price paper on formal logic and its history. The paper was invited by the Royal Society of Sciences and Letters, and Jørgensen was awarded a gold medal for his entry. In 1931 his very large manuscript was published in English with the title Treatise on Formal Logic. This publication immediately brought him recognition outside Denmark, and he apparently came in touch with members of the Vienna Circle around the same time. He was elected to the committee concerning the standardization of the logical terminology, and in 1934 he was asked, together with Neurath and Carnap, to be the editor of the book series called Einheitswissenschaft. After World War Two he published a book in Danish which was later translated into English with the title The Development of the Logical Empiricism and printed as the second volume of The International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science.
It has been said about Jørgensen that he was not a logical positivist in any orthodox sense.​[7]​ In a narrow meaning of ‘logical positivism’ this seems a reasonable claim to make. But thereby one also obscures the fact that logical positivism is no uniform movement and that ‘logical positivism’ and ‘logical empiricism’ was used by different people to distinguish their position from some of the other members of the movement.​[8]​ There exists not a single dogmatic positivistic view which united everybody inside the movement other than their strong anti-metaphysical attitude and a common attitude to the unity of science. This is something Jørgensen understood well as he pointed out in the Introduction to The Development of Logical Empiricism. Here he says about neo-positivism:

“What unites its members is, therefore, not so much definite views or dogmas as definite tendencies and endeavors. An evidence of this is the often considerable divergence and lively discussion between its members and the amendments in the fundamental views that have occurred several times in the course of its development.”​[9]​ 


So there is little basis for claiming that logical empiricism was not broad enough that Jørgensen did not correctly think of his own philosophical endeavour to be included in the positivistic programme. Thus, Jørgensen was the main philosophical spokesman of the movement in Denmark.
In his youth Jørgensen was influenced by Høffding’s empiricism and by neo-Kantian idealism. Among neo-Kantians there was a clear anti-metaphysical approach to philosophy and they attempted to give an epistemological account of the logical foundation of science. As a consequence, they rejected Kant’s idea that things-in-themselves could act as causes for things-as-they-are-for-us. Rather the concept should be understood negatively as a limitation of knowledge. With this philosophical background Jørgensen’s entrance into philosophy was not very different from many of the founding members of the Vienna Circle who were inspired by Ernst Mach’s empiricism and Kant’s critical philosophy.
In the end of the 1930s Jørgensen began writing on a large book about psychology in which he wanted to show that psychical phenomena could be explained based on the same approach to science as neo-positivism opted for. The work carried the title Psykologi paa biologisk grundlag (Psychology on A Biological Foundation) and published between 1941-1945. About the foundation of this work, Jørgensen says in The Development of the Logical Empiricism that he “has used logical-empiricistic viewpoints and methods.”​[10]​ He undoubtedly thought of this work as a contribution to the positivistic attempt of uniting psychology with the natural sciences.  After World War Two, Psykologi paa biologisk grundlag had an important impact on the scientific education of several generations of students at the University of Copenhagen. This was due to the fact that Jørgensen introduced it as part of the curriculum of the propaedeutic philosophy which was mandatory for all enrolled students to pass.
     In his book Jørgensen wanted to demonstrate that psychological phenomena are closely connected to biological processes. He rejected vitalism as a pseudo-explanation based on our lack of precise knowledge of the chemical and physical processes which rule our body and brain. The mental life should just be considered as the most complex form of organic life. It is described as the mind but only known by its consciousness and the ways that expresses itself in virtue of feeling, experiencing, imaginating, thinking, and willing. These various activities appear to the consciousness as phenomena in the same manner as external objects emerge as experiences to the consciousness. Jørgensen then tried, based on those phenomenological premisses, to set up a clear and decisive system of definition and classification for all the phenomena of consciousness. It was his clear opinion that all life manifestations, including the appearances of consciousness, could be explained in terms of physico-chemical processes. Naturally enough he had, in his account of the most complex forms of mental phenomena, to face more and more difficulties of explaining in any concrete details what the mechanics of these processes consisted of because at that time there existed so little experimental evidence of how the brain and the mind operated together. Jørgensen believed, nevertheless, that psychological schools, like introspectivism, behaviourism, and gestalt- and element psychology – apart from their metaphysical hypostatizations, – offered different scientific methods which each and everyone could be used with advance in the study of mental life.
It has often been claimed, even by the present author, that he had a critical attitude towards Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics.​[11]​ This observation is both true and false. Because it was not until the third step in Jørgensen’s philosophical development that he began to raise doubts about Bohr’s basic thought that it was impossible to have deterministic description of the atomic phenomena. In the mid 1950s Jørgensen articulated a critical realistic view on reality according to which he defended a reality that was entirely independent of the theoretical perspective which the knowing subject puts on the phenomena. We have only hypothetical knowledge of such an independent reality, although our beliefs concerning it become more and more confirmed concurrently with the scientific progress.​[12]​ This radical change in Jørgensen’s view on the possibility of science had the consequence that he had to rewrite his chapter “What is psychology?” in Psykologi paa biologisk grundlag.
In the 1930s, when Jørgensen subscribed to the philosophy of the logical empiricism, he had no hesitations of supporting Bohr’s ideas against Einstein’s objections. On this he says: 
“But as far as I know it appears that none of these objections can stand a closer criticism, and therefore one must think that Bohr’s and his fellow partisans’ view suits the present experiences best, yes, that we up to now do not know any other view which accords with the experience.”​[13]​

Although Jørgensen here supports Bohr, various statements in the paper seem to suggest that Jørgensen was not ready to follow Bohr and Heisenberg in their claim that it is in principle impossible to give a deterministic description of atomic processes. Because these two physicists, according to Jørgensen, say that such a description is meaningless, while the view Jørgensen seems to advocate is that experience supports Bohr and Heisenberg’s approach up to now.​[14]​  
A much better grasp of Jørgensen’s understanding of Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics do we find in a small paper “Causality and Quantum Mechanism” from 1937 in which he discussed some misunderstandings of which he acknowledged that he himself had formerly been guilty.
“What I should like to emphasize in this place is the point that Niels Bohr and those agreeing with him in no way consider quantum-theoretical “indeterminism´” or “acausality” a consequence of a positivistic view (epistemological understood) adopted beforehand but that in their opinion it is based on circumstances which presumably necessitate the assumption of “indeterminism” quite regardless of definite epistemological standpoints. As far as I understand, it is deemed necessary to give up the idea that microphysical phenomena are causally determined in the classical sense in case one desires to avoid involving oneself in a series of paradoxes or absurdities which can be tolerated by no physical theory no matter whether the physicist be metaphysician, positivist, realist, or in any other way philosophically infected.”​[15]​


Jørgensen continued to tell how Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy helps physicists to removes paradoxes from the application of quantum mechanics and that indeterminism is the price they must pay to obtain a coherent and consistent theory of quantum objects. He also admitted that it would possibly be easier to reconcile oneself with indeterminism for the reason that it would otherwise produce absurdities than if the principle of positivism had been part of the argument. But Jørgensen then added:
“Quite a different matter is it that the results of atomic physics may serve to support a positivistic epistemology, since not only does quantum mechanics show that even a fundamental notion like the concept of causation is not absolutely necessary to physics but it also points out the danger of operating with assumptions (for instance of “causal determinateness”) which cannot in principle be verified.” ​[16]​

So Jørgensen saw the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics as a vindication of the positivistic epistemology rather than a consequence that had its origin in the verification principle of meaning. By pointing that out, I think that Jørgensen with all fairness reported what Bohr had told him in their conversation.
In his Psykologi paa biologisk grundlag, we can follow how Jørgensen thought that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics supported the epistemology of logical empiricism. Here he not only made a philosophical explication of Bohr’s point of view but he directly defended it with respect to the conditions of talking meaningfully about a physical object:
“As Niels Bohr often has emphasized, the physical objects can strictly speaking only be defined in connection with the experimental situation or other observational circumstances in which their forms of appearance are present. To say that an object exists means that its form of appearance is actually present and a thing without any form of appearance is just a nice example of – nothing.”​[17]​

A couple of pages later Jørgensen characterized this position as neopositivism, after he had rejected both naive and critical realism. The reason why he believed that Copenhagen interpretation was in support of neopositivism was that 
“In modern atomic physics one has … discovered that every physical phenomenon is partly determined by the conditions of observation (instruments and experimental setups) under which they are experienced, and by then one has gone to the whole hog because we must now say that every phenomenon is subjective conditioned, which just means that we can never experience any “things-in-and-of itself.”  Therefore this word does not make any sense, since it can never been shown what it could mean. All we can experience are phenomena, and the distinction of these into private and public or into subjective and objective is just a sign of the fact that each of these phenomena exist in certain, but different, connections with other phenomena which we call “the actual conditions of observation and conditions of description.””​[18]​

These remarks led Jørgensen to draw some general epistemological consequences concerning the results of atomic physics with respect to logical positivism and its concept of science. In order to do so he emphasised the following statements: An expression such as “The object G exists” is just the same as the expression “At least two of G’s forms of appearances exist.” Furthermore, a word can have meaning, only if one can, in principle, decide whether or not it can be applied on anything at all (the verification criteria of meaning). Thus, Jørgensen concluded:
“This view on the meaning of the word “existence” is characteristic for the so-called neo-positivism, and it seems to be the only view, which is compatible with the results of modern logic and the natural sciences. When all is said and done this view consists of the idea that all things which can be experienced are phenomena and that a distinction of these into subjective and objective is due to the lawful connection of every phenomenon with other phenomena which are called its “conditions of observation.” The task of every concrete science consists then in the investigation under which conditions a particular phenomenon appears, i.e. in virtue of which phenomenal connections it occurs.”​[19]​

In other words: around 1940 Jørgensen thought that the empirical foundation of cognitive meaningfulness, which positivists demanded of scientific knowledge, was being confirmed by the development of the atomic physics as it was understood by Bohr and Heisenberg. 

Conclusion
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